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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 (3) (k) (1996); and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in its denial of Plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict as to

the liability of Defendant Bryant after Defendant admitted that he failed to yield the right-of-way
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1996) and failed to introduce evidence of a legally
adequate excuse?
When reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the Court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Finlayson v. Brady, 121
Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952). The motion should have been granted if reasonable minds
would not differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence presented. Management
Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Ass'n ex rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone
Pines. Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).
2.

Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs motion for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict when Defendant Bryant admitted he failed to yield the right-of-way and Defendant
acted on signals given by Defendant UTA's driver?
With respect to the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the standard of
review is whether, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah
1988).

1

3.

Did the trial court err in refusing to administer Plaintiffs proposed jury

questionnaire regarding tort reform, and if so did the error substantially impair Plaintiffs ability
to make informed peremptory challenges?
This issue is examined under an abuse of discretion standard. Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d
460, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). A trial court's
discretionary ruling will be overturned only upon a showing that "the abuse of discretion rose to
the level of reversible error." State v. Hall 797 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert denied
804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). Reversible error has been committed when the appellant's right to
the informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been "substantially impaired." Barrett v.
Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Hornsbv v. Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)).

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, there are no
constitutional provisions or statutes whose interpretation is determinative or of central
importance to the appeal, with the exception of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1996), which
provides as follows:
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall
yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction which is so close to the turning vehicle as
to constitute an immediate hazard.
///
///
///
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Procedural History
On March 17, 1994, Plaintiff/Appellant John Durrant filed a complaint for personal
injury against Defendant/Appellee Bradley E. Bryant in the Second Judicial District Court of
Weber County. (Dist. Ct. R. 4.) Defendant Bryant answered this complaint on April 13, 1994.
(Dist. Ct. R. 14.) On October 26, 1994, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against
Defendant Bryant, and added as defendants Workers Compensation Fund of Utah1 and the Utah
Transit Authority ("UTA"). (Dist. Ct. R. 1.) Defendant Bryant's answer to the First Amended
Complaint was filed on November 14, 1994. (Dist. Ct. R. 58.) Defendant UTA's answer was
filed on December 14, 1994. (Dist. Ct. R. 72.)
The matter came on for jury trial on October 30, 1996, before the Honorable Stanton M.
Taylor. (Dist. Ct. R. 528.) The result was a mistrial because so many jurors were dismissed for
cause that there were insufficient jurors left to make up a panel after peremptory challenges. (Id.)
The case came on a second time on February 18-21, 1997. (Dist. Ct. R. 613.) Before the
October, 1996 trial, Plaintiff filed a motion to submit a questionnaire regarding tort reform to the
jury panel. (Dist. Ct. R. 436.) The questionnaire was not submitted to the panel at either trial.
(Dist. Ct. R. 528,618.)
After the conclusion of Plaintiff s case on February 19, 1997, Plaintiff made a motion for
directed verdict as to the liability of Defendant Bryant pursuant to Rule 50 (a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. (R. Vol. II 234:2-7.) This motion was denied by the court on February 21,
1997. (R. Vol. IV 39:15-20.) The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action on February 21,

1

Although Workers Compensation Fund was named as a defendant, it did not participate in the litigation or trial in
any way and is not a party to this appeal.
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1997. (Dist. Ct. R. 828-831.) Following the verdict, Plaintiff made a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 50 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dist.
Ct. R. 618.) The trial court denied this motion. (Id.) The final judgment was signed by Judge
Taylor on April 29, 1997, and was entered by the court on Vlay 6,1997. (Dist. Ct. R. 881.)
Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on May 23, 1997. (Dist. Ct. R. 890.)
B. Statement of the Facts
This matter arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on September 30, 1993, on
Riverdale Road in Ogden, Utah. (R. Vol. I 158:15-20.) Traffic was heavy due to construction on
Riverdale Road. (R. Vol. I 163:15-18; 172:20-22). There w e r e signs indicating that
northbound traffic was merging into one lane. (R. Vol. I 167:17 - 168:3.) At the site of the
accident, however, both northbound lanes were open for travel. (R. Vol. I 194:22-24; 202:25 203:4.)
Defendant Bryant, traveling southbound, stopped in the median to make a left hand turn.
(R. Vol. 1172:23-25.) A UTA bus, traveling northbound in the lane next to the median, stopped
before Defendant Bryant's car. (R. Vol. I 193:10-13.) The bus driver waved Defendant Bryant
through, then checked his mirror and motioned for Defendant Bryant to stop. The driver checked
his mirror again and then waved to Bryant to proceed in front of him. (R. Vol. I 173:10 174:13.) Acting on the bus driver's hand motions, Defendant Bryant proceeded to turn left. (Id)
Defendant Bryant then struck Plaintiff s car, which was traveling northbound in the outside lane.
(Id; R. Vol. I 186:23-25; 192:4-6).
Defendant Bryant admitted that he failed to yield th§ right-of-way to Plaintiff. (R. Vol. I
203:5-7.) Defendant also admitted that when he proceeded, he could not see whether the outside
lane was <;lear because the bus blocked his view. (R. Vol. I 187:3-18.) Once Defendant's car
4

had cleared the bus, however, he did not stop to see if the outside lane was clear before
proceeding. (R. Vol. I 174:12-16; 202:16-18.)
As a result of the accident, Plaintiff suffered two bulging discs and one herniated disc in
his cervical spine. (R. Vol. II 38:17-24; 41:2-8.) Plaintiff had previously undergone several
surgeries on his lower back. (R. Vol. II 31:7-10.) The accident of September, 1993, caused an
increase in pain in this area. (R. Vol. II 30:16 - 31:5.) Plaintiffs injuries disabled him from
work until January 24, 1994. (R. Vol. II 47:4-13.) Plaintiff incurred medical bills for treatment
reasonably and necessarily related to the accident in excess of $3,000. (R. Vol. II 67:8 - 68:5.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Second District erred in its denial of Plaintiff s motion for a directed verdict as to the
negligence of Defendant Bryant. When a public safety statute has been violated, it is prima facie
evidence of negligence. The defendant then has the burden of presenting evidence of legally
sufficient justification for the violation. Defendant Bryant presented no such evidence of a legal
excuse, nor did he ever modify or explain his admission that he had failed to yield the right-ofway to Plaintiff. Therefore, the trial court should have granted Plaintiffs motion for a directed
verdict.
The trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict for the same reasons. Defendant Bryant's own testimony showed that he failed to yield
the right-of-way and failed to maintain a proper lookout. The jury's finding that Defendant was
not negligent despite these admissions is not supported by the evidence.
With respect to UTA, a driver who signals to or directs another driver may be liable for a
resulting accident if circumstances exist to show that the driver signaled to was reasonable in
5

relying on the signal. Given the size of the bus, the heavy traffic, and the bus driver's obvious
checking of his mirror prior to waving Defendant Bryant through, there are sufficient
circumstances to indicate that Bryant was reasonable in his reliance on the bus driver's signal. If
this was the jury's conclusion, the jury should have found UTA negligent. If, alternatively, the
jury found that Bryant was not reasonable in relying on the driver's signal, the jury should have
found Bryant negligent. As the verdict stands, the jury's conclusion that neither party was
negligent cannot be supported by the evidence.
The trial court further erred in refusing to give Plaintiffs proposed jury questionnaire
regarding tort reform. Plaintiff has a right to discover all psychological biases or prejudices
which may influence Plaintiffs choice of peremptory challenges, even if these biases do not rise
to the level of a challenge for cause. Recent Utah appellate decisions specifically provide that
this right includes an obligation on the part of the trial court to question jurors regarding their
exposure to tort reform propaganda.
The trial court's refusal to administer the questionnaire or to question the panel
specifically regarding tort reform propaganda denied Plaintiff the opportunity to discover which
jurors had been exposed to articles or other publicity, or to explore the nature and extent of the
exposure. Plaintiffs right to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges was thus
substantially impaired, which constitutes reversible error.
Finally, beyond the refusal to ask tort reform-related questions, the court's refusal to use
the questionnaire format resulted in irreparable tainting of the panel. Instead of maintaining
confidential responses, the court permitted the entire panel to listen to each juror's prejudices and
biases regarding lawsuits and insurance. The neutrality of the panel which was eventually
selected was hopelessly destroyed. As a matter of policy, the court should have administered the
6

questionnaire to preserve the integrity of the panel and to allow counsel to explore issues of
opinion such as tort reform and personal injury lawsuits in private.

ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT BECAUSE DEFENDANT BRYANT ADMITTED
NEGLIGENCE.
The court should have granted Plaintiffs motion for directed verdict because Defendant
Bryant testified at trial that he failed to yield the right-of-way to Plaintiff in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-73. (R. Vol. I 203:5-7.) Violation of a public safety statute is prima facie
evidence of negligence. Ames v. Mass, 846 P.2d 468, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Gawv.
State ex. rel. Utah Dept. of Transp., 798 P.2d 1130, 1135 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied per
unpublished order of Utah Supreme Court (Jan. 11, 1991)). The evidence of negligence must
then be rebutted by evidence of justification or excuse. Id
In order to establish that the statutory violation was justified or excused, the person
violating the law has the burden of proving one of the following exceptions:
1. Obeying the law would have created an even greater risk of harm.
2. The person who violated the law was faced with an emergency that person did
not create, and, by reason of the emergency, that person could not obey the
law.
3. The person who violated the law made a reasonable effort to obey the law, but
was unable to do so.
4. The person who violated the law could not obey the law because the person
was incapable of doing so.
5. The person violating the law was incapable of understanding the requirements
of the law.
Hall v. Warren, 692 P.2d 737 (Utah 1984). See also Gaw, 798 P.2d 1130; Jorgensen v. Issa, 739
P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); MUJI 3.11 (1993).
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None of these five excuses was established in the case at bar. Defendant Bryant testified
that he failed to yield the right of way to Plaintiff when he turned left in front of Plaintiff s car.
The import of this testimony could only be lessened if, at some other point in Defendant's
testimony, he corrected, explained, or modified his statement. See Ewan v. Butters, 16 Utah 2d
272, 275, 399 P.2d 210, 212 (1965). Defendant Bryant never retracted or modified his admission
in any way.
Once prima facie evidence of negligence had been established by this admission,
Defendant failed to meet his burden by proving that the statutory violation was justified or
excused. There was no evidence admitted at trial that Defendant had to violate the statute
because of a greater risk of harm, emergency, incapacity or incapability to understand the law.
The only remaining possibility is that Defendant reasonably tried to obey the law, but was unable
to do so. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant, though, even this
possibility must be ruled out.
Defendant's sole explanation was that he had obeyed the signal of another driver, that he
relied on the UTA bus driver who waved him through. However, this rationale is not sufficient
to excuse Defendant's statutory violation. Defendant's own testimony demonstrates that he did
not attempt to yield the right of way to Plaintiff. Defendant was in a position of safety in the
median. (R. Vol. I 200:13-15.) Defendant was still in a position of safety when he moved in
front of the bus. (R. Vol. I 200:16-18.) Defendant admitted that when he moved out from in
front of the bus, into the outside lane of traffic, he became unsafe. (R. Vol. I 200:19-21.)
Despite this admission, Defendant also admitted that he never stopped to see if the
outside lane of traffic was clear. (R. Vol. I 174:12-16; 202:16-18.) There was nothing to
prevent Defendant from stopping as he left the safety of the bus's lane to check for traffic, and
8

Defendant never attempted to do so. Thus, even when Defendant's testimony is viewed in the
light most favorable to him, Defendant did not meet his burden of showing that he tried to obey
the law and was unable to do so.
Defendant's failure to provide evidence of a legally sufficient excuse for his violation of
the statute left the evidence of negligence unrefuted. At that point, reasonable minds could not
have differed in finding that Defendant was, in fact, negligent. Therefore, the court erred in
denying Plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict as to the negligence of Defendant Bryant.

II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
A. The Motion Should Have Been Granted as to Defendant Bryant Because he
Admitted Negligence.
Defendant Bryant's testimony, which was set forth above, is straightforward: Defendant
could not see past the bus, but proceeded when the bus driver waved him through and struck
Plaintiffs car. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Defendant Bryant, this evidence
cannot support the jury's finding of no negligence. First, as argued in the preceding section,
Defendant Bryant admitted he was guilty of a statutory violation and failed to provide any
excuse. The jury was given MUJI 3.11 regarding statutory violations as Instruction No. 35.2
The jury was also instructed that a driver has a duty to yield the right-of-way to any vehicle close
enough to present an immediate hazard. (See Instructions 42, 45, and 46.)
The law is clear that Defendant had a duty, both to keep a proper lookout and to yield the
right-of-way. The evidence establishes that Defendant proceeded when he did not know whether
or not it was safe and that he breached his duty to yield the right-of-way. The jury could not
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have found that Defendant was not negligent without completely disregarding the facts and the
instructions. Therefore, the court should have granted plaintiffs motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict as to Defendant Bryant.
B. The Motion Should Have Been Granted as to Defendant UTA Because UTA's
Driver Negligently Waved Bryant Through.
As UTA's driver was never found to testify, the only evidence regarding his actions
comes from Defendant Bryant. Bryant testified that the driver initially waved him on, then
checked his mirror, motioned Bryant to stop, checked his mirror again, and finally gave Bryant a
signal to proceed through. Defendant Bryant relied on these hand communications and
proceeded past the bus, where he collided with Plaintiffs car.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to UTA, it is possible that the jury
found that Bryant completely misinterpreted the driver's hand signals. This explanation simply
does not hold water. The signals, as explained and demonstrated by Defendant Bryant, are
universal for "come on through" and "stop." Moreover, if the jury did conclude that Bryant
misinterpreted the signals, it would have found Bryant liable.
The jury could also have found that Bryant understood the driver, but was not reasonable
in relying on his signals. This finding is similarly inconsistent with the jury's finding that Bryant
was not negligent. Further, the jury had been instructed that while signaling another driver to
proceed is not necessarily negligence, such an act can be negligence if connected with other
circumstances.3 This instruction was based on Giron v. Welch, 842 P.2d 863 (Utah 1992), a
case in which Plaintiff Giron was struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant Panter Noorbakhsh.
Norbakhsh had been waved through the intersection by Defendant Jay Welch.
2

For the Court's convenience, this instruction is set forth at Appendix 1.
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The Court in Giron noted:
It is possible that under certain conditions upon certain highways,
such as hills or in the nighttime, a driver of a motor vehicle in
signaling a car following such a vehicle to proceed, might, by such
a signal or conduct on the part of the driver, be responsible for an
accident in which the person relying upon such signal to proceed
became involved.
Id at 864 (quoting Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073, 1083 (1955)).
The Court then concluded that these conditions did not exist in Giron for two reasons.
First, Defendant Noorbakhsh had not relied on Defendant Welch's signal because she stopped
once she passed the Welch vehicle and looked for oncoming traffic. Giron, 842 P.2d at 865.
Second, the Court found no indication that Defendant Welch had checked to his rear before
waving Defendant Noorbakhsh on, and thus Noorbakhsh could not reasonably assume that the
signal meant "all clear." Id.
The present case is distinguishable from Giron on both counts. Defendant Bryant's
testimony is uncontroverted that he obeyed the hand communications of the bus driver and
without looking or stopping, crossed into Plaintiffs lane of traffic. It is evident that Bryant did
rely on the driver's signals. Further, Defendant testified that the bus driver checked his mirror
twice before motioning Bryant to proceed and that at one point the driver gave him a "stop"
signal after checking his mirror. Bryant, unable to see oncoming traffic because of the size of the
bus and the heavy traffic, concluded that the driver had observed and evaluated approaching
traffic before signaling.
These facts, when considered in conjunction with the instruction, leave the jury with two
possible conclusions. The jury could have found that the circumstances cited in the instructions

3

Instruction No. 48 is reproduced at Appendix 2.
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did not exist, but that would mean that Bryant was not reasonable in relying on the driver's
signals and compel the conclusion that Bryant was negligent. Alternatively, the jury could have
found that Bryant did reasonably rely on the driver. In that case, the jury would have impliedly
found that the driver was at fault. The jury's verdict that neither defendant was negligent is a
paradox which cannot be supported by the evidence and the instructions given to them.
Therefore, the court should have granted Plaintiffs motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.

III. THE COURT'S FAILURE TO ADMINISTER A JURY QUESTIONNAIRE
REGARDING TORT REFORM SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED
PLAINTIFF'S EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
A. The District Court Erred in Failing to Conduct Adequate Voir Dire Regarding
Tort Reform.
This Court has emphasized the critical role that jury voir dire plays in giving all litigants
a fair and impartial trial. See, e ^ , State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991).
The modern voir dire process is not merely conducted to determine
that jurors who have been called to service are legally qualified to
serve on a jury panel. The process has evolved into a means of
detecting and, so far as possible, eliminating bias and opinion from
the courtroom.
Id. (citations omitted). In addition to discovering actual bias, it is also a purpose of voir dire to
ferret out data to assist counsel in making informed peremptory challenges. State v. Worthen,
765 P.2d 839, 844-45 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983)).
Certainly a trial judge has sound discretion in limiting voir dire examinations. However,
judges are to take care to "adequately and completely probe jurors on all possible issues of bias .
. . ." James, 819 P.2d at 799. Further, discretion is to be "liberally exercised in favor of allowing
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counsel to elicit information from prospective jurors." Id (citations omitted). Voir dire should
be conducted in a way "which not only meets constitutional requirements, but also enables
litigants and their counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges and which attempts, as
much as possible, to eliminate bias and prejudice from the trial proceedings." Id.
This Court has also pointed out:
The fairness of a trial may depend on the right of counsel to
ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and biases,
both conscious and subconscious, even though they "would not
have supported a challenge for cause." . . . Juror attitudes revealed
during voir dire may indicate dimly perceived, yet deeply rooted,
psychological biases or prejudices that may not rise to the level of
a for-cause challenge but nevertheless support a peremptory challenge.
Worthen, 765 P.2d at 845 (quoting State v. Ball 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)).
In civil cases, juror attitudes regarding and exposure to tort reform propaganda are
certainly relevant to the exercise of peremptory challenges. "Reason suggests that exposure to
tort-reform propaganda may foster a subconscious bias within certain prospective jurors."
Evans, 824 P.2d at 467.
In light of the pervasive dissemination of tort-reform information,
and the corresponding potential for general exposure to such
information by potential jurors, a plaintiff is entitled to know which
jurors, if any, have been so exposed.
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 101. The reason why tort reform exposure is of such importance to litigants
is that a juror's bias may arise from widespread media reports and insurance advertisements.
Evans, 824 P.2d at 468. Such bias or prejudice may affect the very outcome of the case. "We
cannot assume that a jury would manifest its bias by only reducing damages. It is equally likely
that a biased jury might act on its bias by finding the defendant not negligent." Id.
Stated another way, a juror who has become convinced that
damage awards are way out of hand might not restrict the
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manifestation of his or her bias to the issue of damages; such
a juror may well perceive that the first line of attack in keeping
damages as low as possible is in finding plaintiff has no cause
of action.
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 100, fn. 4.
Evans was a medical malpractice case. At trial, the judge refused to ask many questions
submitted by plaintiffs counsel to probe jurors' exposure to tort reform propaganda. Evans, 824
P.2d at 461-62. Instead, the trial court in Evans asked the jury as follows:
Many of you have heard and read articles, and there have been
television programs, with regard to negligence on the part of doctors.
Do any of you have any strong feelings as a result of seeing or reading
anything about medical negligence that would make it so that you
couldn't be fair and impartial here today?
Id. The Court of Appeals found that this inquiry was not sufficient because instead of first
asking which jurors had been exposed to such programs, so that plaintiff could identify them, the
court instead focused on discovering for-cause type bias. Id, Even when a plaintiff does not
present specific examples of propaganda to the court, a "plaintiff has a legitimate interest in
discovering which jurors may have read or heard information generally on medical negligence or
tort reform." Id "The trial judge's line of questions ignored [plaintiffs] need to gather
information to assist in exercising her peremptory challenges." Id
In the case at bar, the district court committed the same error as the court in Evans.
Refusing to administer the jury questionnaire submitted by Plaintiff, the court instead asked one
broad, general question regarding tort reform and related biases:
All right. I'd — there have been a — oh, kind of a lot of publicity
in recent years arising out of some cases that are — I think most
people's perceptions were that there may have been some excessive
judgments and that sort of thing.
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I can't remember, but it seemed to me there was a lady who lost an
eye when a 7-Up cap popped off and hit her; another lady who spilled
a glass of— or a cup of McDonald's coffee in her lap. And as a result
of these kinds of things there's been a lot of publicity about tort reform.
Is there any of you here who can recall specifically reading articles on
— on the need to change the system? Do any of you remember reading
anything like that? Is there anybody here who has not heard of these
kinds of cases where ~ where you felt like maybe there was an excessive
judgment? Anybody here who has not heard of those kinds of cases?
(R. Vol. I 26:4-23.) The court then paused. Receiving no response at this point, the court
continued:
The concern of the Court is that we have a case here to try. If —
if someone comes into the trial with a preconceived notion that
a particular result should be brought about ~ in other words, if
someone has a preconceived notion of whether the plaintiff should
win or the plaintiff should lose, a preconceived notion about if —
if the plaintiff wins how much money should be awarded, I kind of
need to know if— if you have some pretty strong feelings about that
sort of thing. We — we want the — we want this case to be decided
upon the facts that are adduced here in this court and not be influenced
by someone's preconceived notions of what ought to happen or not
to happen. Do you see my concern? Is there anybody here, for
example — yes, sir?
(R. Vol. I 26:25-27:15.)
The court then began receiving juror responses regarding bias or prejudice arising out of
their personal experiences with the legal system. At each response, the court questioned the juror
to determine whether he or she could set aside their bias, and if the eventual response was
negative, the juror was dismissed for cause. (R. Vol. I 27-38.) The court never asked which
jurors had been exposed to tort-reform propaganda, as required by Evans. Instead, the court
merely asked if the jurors had heard of cases with large verdicts and whether they had any
preconceived notions regarding the outcome of the case.
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This is exactly the type of for-cause inquiry which was held to be insufficient in Evans.
Had the court administered the jury questionnaire requested by Plaintiff, a copy of which is
attached as Appendix 3, the parties would have been able to identify any juror who had been
exposed to tort-reform propaganda and ascertain the nature and extent of the exposure. The
court's refusal to administer the questionnaire or ask the questions contained therein denied
Plaintiff the opportunity to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges.
B. The District Court's Error was Sufficiently Prejudicial to Warrant Reversal.
The trial court's abuse of discretion alone would not require reversal, but "[substantial
impairment of the right to informed exercise of peremptory challenges is reversible error."
Homsby, 758 P.2d at 933. The court in Evans found that the trial court's failure to conduct
adequate voir dire did not rise to the level of reversible error, noting that the trial court had
specifically asked jurors if they could not be impartial because of their exposure to tort reform
material and that the court had asked about malpractice law in general. Evans, 824 P.2d at 468.
However, two years after Evans, in another medical malpractice case, the Court of
Appeals found that a court's refusal to ask specific tort-reform questions was reversible error.
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 103. Commenting that the Evans decision "must have been a close call,"
the Barrett court reasoned that it was a different matter when the trial court never mentioned
articles and programs and never explored the idea that lawsuits against doctors could prompt
strong feelings. Id. The court further explained that there are two crucial purposes served by
preliminary questioning regarding exposure to tort reform information:
First, these questions identify those jurors to whom particularized
questions aimed at detecting actual bias may be productively directed.
Second, regardless of a prospective juror's response to particularized
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questions about the effect of mere exposure, counsel can include the
fact of exposure in the calculus for determining how to best utilize
peremptory challenges.
Id
Unless a party can identify jurors who have been exposed to tort reform materials, he will
be unable to ask appropriate questions to discover bias and thus denied information to assist in
the use of peremptory challenges. In this circumstance, inadequate voir dire substantially
impairs the informed exercise of peremptory challenges and justifies reversal. Id. at 104.
This situation is precisely what occurred in the case at bar. The trial court glossed over
the issue of exposure to articles and other propaganda, and instead drew the jury's attention to
large, well-publicized verdicts. The court's sole question was then whether the panel had any
pre-conceived notions which might affect their decision in the case. This voir dire utterly failed
to identify jurors exposed to tort reform propaganda and thus prevented counsel from either
exploring the issue further or factoring exposure into the decision regarding peremptory
challenges. As plaintiffs right to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges was
substantially impaired, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision and order a new trial.
C. The Trial Court's Failure to Ask Tort-Reform Questions in a Questionnaire
Format Tainted the Jury Panel.
If this Court finds that the voir dire administered by the trial court regarding tort reform
propaganda was sufficient, the Court should still order a new trial because of the trial court's
refusal to use a questionnaire. By asking the panel in open court whether or not they had strong
feelings about the outcome of the case, the trial court opened up the panel to listen to each jurors'
individual biases about lawsuits. Two instances in particular demonstrate the damage.
A Mr. Cummings advised the court that he had been sued when someone playing with his
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kids had been hurt. (R. Vol. I 28:15-24.) When the court attempted to rehabilitate him for
purposes of cause, Mr. Cummings explained
Well, my feelings on lawsuits are there are way, way too
many of them over stupid things and people need to start
taking a little responsibility for their own actions instead of
trying to blame them on somebody else.
(R. Vol. I 29:5-9.) The court's response was to comment that this was a fair statement. (R. Vol.
I 29:10-13.) As the court continued to attempt to rehabilitate Mr. Cummings, Mr. Cummings
told the panel that he gets "really disgusted" whenever he hears about someone suing somebody
else. (R. Vol. I 30:10-12.) Although Mr. Cummings was eventually excused for cause (R. Vol. I
32:17-18), the entire panel listened for some minutes as he shared his opinions about lawsuits.
The second incident involved a Mr. Lee, who informed the court that he would have a
bias against an insurance company. (R. Vol. I 35:5-7.) The court responded by telling him, "We
don't have one of those here today." (R. Vol. I 35:8-9.) Comforted, Mr. Lee advised the court
that he was fine as long as there was no insurance company involved. (R. Vol. I 35:14-15.) The
court then told the panel emphatically, "There's no insurance company involved." (R. Vol. I
35:16-17.)
The Evans court noted that modern jurors will certainly suspect the existence of
insurance. Evans, 824 P.2d at 464, fn. 3. Thus, Utah courts have recognized that "whether a
plaintiff may discuss insurance with the jury must be evaluated from the particular facts of the
individual case." Id, at 464. Regardless, any "inquiry into insurance-related issues cannot be
used merely to inform the jury that defendant is covered by insurance . . . ." Barrett, 868 P.2d at
98 (citations omitted). Here, rather than advising the jury that the defendants were covered by
insurance, the open-court voir dire process resulted in the jury being instructed that they were not
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insured. Had Plaintiff advised the jury that insurance coverage existed, he would certainly have
been subject to a motion for mistrial. This result was equally prejudicial.
In both of these instances, the panel was exposed to opinions and information which
could have been kept confidential. Administration of a questionnaire would have permitted
jurors to offer their opinions in writing, instead of subjecting every potential juror to outside bias
and prejudice. Based on the nature of the responses, the court could then determine whether to
attempt to rehabilitate jurors in chambers or in open court.
There is no Utah case law requiring the use of a questionnaire, or even that the court ask
every specific question submitted by counsel. See Barrett, 868 P.2d at 104 (citing Hornsby, 758
P.2d at 933). However, Utah courts have strongly encouraged thorough voir dire, and trial
courts' discretion is to be liberally exercised in favor of eliciting information. See James, 819
P.2d at 799. The Montana Supreme Court, in a decision relied on by both Evans and Barrett,
explained:
When insurance companies inject the issue of insurance into
the consciousness of every potential juror through a high priced
advertising campaign,. . . they threaten every plaintiffs right to
an impartial jury. . . . In such cases, it is only fair that attorneys
have some means to secure this right for their clients.
Borkoski v. Yost, 183 Mont. 28, 39, 594 P.2d 688, 694 (1979) (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, where it was evident that expression of strong opinions and even the
court's attempts at rehabilitation influenced an otherwise neutral panel, the use of a jury
questionnaire would have prevented any possibility of jury taint. For policy reasons, this Court
should support the use of a questionnaire where requested as what may be the only viable way to
ensure a plaintiffs right to a fair trial.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Plaintiff s motion for a directed
verdict because Defendant Bryant admitted negligence and failed to provide an adequate excuse.
Further, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Plaintiff s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because of Defendant Bryant's admissions and the uncontroverted
evidence that he relied on the hand signals of UTA's bus driver. Finally, the Court should find
that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury the questionnaire regarding tort-reform
propaganda and to ask the questions contained therein. This refusal constitutes reversible error
because it substantially impaired Plaintiffs right to informed peremptory challenges, and thus
denied Plaintiff a fair trial.
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APPENDIX 1
Jury Instruction No. 35
A violation of a safety law is evidence of negligence if it is shown that:
1. The person injured belonged to a class of people the law intended to protect;
and
2. The law intended to protect against the type of harm which in fact occurred as
a result of the violation. However, there are five exceptions to this rule:
(1) When obeying the law would have created an even greater risk of
harm.
(2) When the person who violated the law was faced with an emergency
that person did not create, and, by reason of the emergency, that person
could not obey the law.
(3) When the person who violated the law made a reasonable effort to
obey the law, but was unable to do so.
(4) When the person who violated the law could not obey the law because
the person was incapable of doing so.
(5) When the person violating the law was incapable of understanding the
requirements of the law.
The person violating the law has the burden of proving one of the exceptions. If
an exception is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, you must disregard the
violation of the safety law, and simply decide whether the person acted with reasonable
care under the circumstances.

Tab 2

APPENDIX 2
Jury Instruction No. 48
You are instructed that the waving of another driver to proceed in front of you is
not negligence since all drivers should know that the waving driver does not have the
authority to give up a right-of-way belonging to another driver.
However, such conduct can be negligence if connected with other circumstances
relating to the accident, accident scene, condition of roadway, etc.

Tab 3

APPENDIX NO. 3
Juror Questionnaire
Submitted by Plaintiff

This questionnaire will be distributed only to the Court and attorneys for the
parties. Please answer the following to the best of your ability. If you do not understand
a question or do not know the answer, please write "Do No Understand" in the space
provided. If there is insufficient space provided for the answer, please write your answer
in the margin next to the question. Please write or print legibly.
1) Have you read magazine or newspaper articles or other literature suggesting
there is a lawsuit crisis or the need for "tort reform"?
YES

NO

If "Yes," please describe the magazine or newspaper and what the articles state:

2) Have you read any articles or other literature suggesting that jury verdicts are
excessive or unreasonable?
YES

NO

If "Yes," please describe the article or literature and its substance:

3) Have you heard anything on television or radio about a lawsuit crisis or
excessive jury verdicts?
YES

NO

If "Yes," please describe the talk show, news, tele-journal, etc., and what you saw
and/or heard:

4) Do you hold the opinion that in this country today there is a lawsuit crisis
caused by excessive jury verdicts?
YES

NO

If "Yes," please explain:

5) Do you feel insurance premiums are too high due to excessive lawsuits and/or
jury verdicts?
YES
If "Yes," please explain:

NO

7) Do you believe a lawsuit is not a proper method of resolving disputes
concerning compensation for personal injuries?
YES

NO

If "Yes," please explain:

8) Do you feel that limits should be placed on a person's right to sue another for
personal injuries or that juries should be limited in the amount they can award
as damages?
YES

NO

If "Yes," please explain:

9) If you find for the Plaintiff and if you find that the Plaintiff has suffered
serious and substantial damages, will you have difficulty awarding the
Plaintiff for the full amount of damages that the evidence supports?
YES
If "Yes," please explain:

NO

